Monday, October 31, 2011

Piwik ≤ 1.5.1 multiple XSS vulnerabilities

Some time ago I discovered a few interesting XSS vulnerabilities in Piwik Open Source Web Analytics software. Thanks to developers, all of those are now fixed in Piwik 1.6. But nonetheless, these are not the usual XSS cases, so I found them interesting enough to publish this.

Piwik is a downloadable, open source (GPL licensed) real time web analytics software program. It provides you with detailed reports on your website visitors: the search engines and keywords they used, the language they speak, your popular pages… and so much more.

Piwik aims to be an open source alternative to Google Analytics, and is already used on more than 150,000 websites.

Friday, October 28, 2011

Poor Princess Leia! CSRF domain hijack is a microblogging platform with over 32 millions of users, with Alexa global rank of 45. had a CSRF vulnerability on blog settings page[blog-name]/settings that allowed for launching targeted attacks against a specified blog to hijack its domain and perform other potentially severe actions on behalf of a victim user.

Monday, October 24, 2011

Stripping Referrer for fun and profit

tldr: New methods for client side only (no server side script) referrer stripping in POST & GET requests. Code at the end.

Referer is that tiny bit of information that browser sends to servers while you click your way through interwebs, always carrying the URL of the webpage you've clicked the link at (more or less). It's useful for webdevelopers. For example, if they know you've reached their page from Google search results they can tailor the webpage especially for you. Of course, it's a privacy leak, so users can turn off referrer sending in current browsers. All in all, Referer is usually spoken in SEO circles, which is not my pair of shoes. However, at least one thing makes Referer very interesting from security point of view.

Tuesday, October 11, 2011

The sad state of DOM security (or how we all ruled Mario's challenge)

A few days ago Mario Heiderich posted second installment of his xssme challenges (viewable in Firefox only for now). But it wasn't a usual challenge. The goal was not to execute your Javascript - it was to get access to the DOM object property (document.cookie) without user interaction. In fact, the payload wasn't filtered at all.

My precious!

This goes along Mario's work on locking DOM and XSS eradication attempt. The concept is that server side filtering for XSS will eventually fail if you need to accept HTML. Further on - sometimes Javascript code should be accepted from the client (mashups are everywhere!), instead we want it to run inside a sandbox, limiting access to some crucial properties (location, cookie, window, some tokens, our internal application object etc.). That's basically what Google Caja tries to achieve server-side. But server does not know about all those browser quirks, parsing issues - it's a different environment after all.

So if a total XSS eradication is possible - it has to be client-side, in the browser.
Of course, this requires some support from the browser and the most common weapon is ECMAScript 5 Object.defineProperty() and friends. Basically, it allows you to redefine a property of an object (say, document.cookie) with your own implementation and lock it down so further redefines are not possible.

In theory, it's great. You insert some Javascript code, locking down your precious DOM assets, then you can output unmodified client's code which is already operating in a controlled, sandboxed environment - and you're done. In theory. Read on!