Showing posts with label clickjack. Show all posts
Showing posts with label clickjack. Show all posts

Wednesday, July 6, 2011

Imgur.com session hijacking

Session hijacking usually requires XSS vulnerability (or MITM attack). But what to do when there is none? Of course, we might trick the user with UI Redressing!

Yesterday I presented a new way to trigger content extraction. Being UI redressing vector, it requires user intervention, this time tricking user to copy & paste some text through his clipboard to solve a kind of CAPTCHA challenge. Today we'll make a real life example of using this method.

Tuesday, July 5, 2011

Cross domain content extraction with fake captcha

Content extraction is one of the recently documented UI redressing vectors. It exploits Firefox vulnerability that allows to display any URL HTML source in an iframe like this:
<iframe src="view-source:http://any-page-you.like/cookies-included">
With social engineering attacker tricks user into selecting (usually invisible) page source and dragging it to attackers' controlled textarea. A simple demo is here:

Drag & drop other page source (cross-domain)
Once attacker gets the page source dropped into his textarea, he may begin to extract contents (like session IDs, user names, anti csrf tokens etc.) and launch further attacks.

However, this way of using the vector requires significant effort from a user and is pretty difficult to exploit in real world situation (there's some clicking and dragging involved). Also, it will stop working once Mozilla disallows cross origin drag & dropping.

I've found a neat way to do cross-origin content extraction that might be more suitable for some classes of websites. Ladies and gentleman, let me present Fake Captcha:

Thursday, March 17, 2011

Who's behind Facebook clickjacking scams?

Clickjacking is a pretty advanced technique even for security-minded programmers. I guess most of pentesters would have a hard time quickly preparing a robust demonstration of a clickjacking attack. This requires some advanced CSS/Javascript and HTML knowledge. One needs to know how to hide a content or how to make it follow the mouse and account for all browsers quirks. Clearly the guys behind Facebook clickjacking *.info scams have some exceptional skills. Or do they?

Recently I got an email from one of my readers - he analyzed the actual code used in an attack, did some googling around for snippets of it and he found the person that is (supposedly, we have no proof yet) the code author of recent attacks. Meet bhav - and tremble before his mighty coder skills!

Tuesday, March 15, 2011

Exploiting the unexploitable XSS with clickjacking

The technique is listed as a contestant in Top 10 Web Hacking Techniques of 2011 poll.


Clickjacking needs some loving. Contrary to what is being thought, it's not only used for Facebook viral scams. As shown by last year's Paul Stone's studies, now it's not only just hide-the-button-and-follow-the-mouse trick. It even got the more accurate name of UI Redressing (which is right, as attackers are not after your clicks, they profit from playing with the UI of the victim application). In this post we'll play a game to see how advanced UI-Redressing attacks look like and how an attacker may trigger an unexploitable XSS flaw in an application.

Monday, October 18, 2010

Dont-Text.info / FightingGuy.info facebook worm - full analysis

Today another Facebook worm utilising clickjacking attack is spreading - as for now it has infected around 7000 profiles (yes, we do have the stats :). It's spreading, as usual, as a link on your friends' Facebook pages with the text I will never text Again After seeing this!!:

I will never text Again After seeing this!!

There are many variants available! - e.g. This American GUY must be Stoned to Death for doing this to a GIRL (NO SURVEYS)


Update: There are, as I suspected, additional domains that host the same worm - dangerous texts / domains are also (do a reverse IP lookup to see additional domains):
  • happy-mc-meals.info - OMG... Look What This 6 YEAR OLD found in Her HAPPY MEAL from McDonalds! (NO SURVEYS)
  • craziestguy.info - This American GUY must be Stoned to Death for doing this to a GIRL (NO SURVEYS)
  • stupid-dress.info - Girl Gets Kicked Out Of School For DRESSING LIKE THIS! OMG!
  • girls-secrets.us - 21 Things Women Can Do That Guys Cant!
  • nevertexting.info
  • never-text.info
  • crazyamerican.info
  • usabadguy.info
  • guy-girl.info
  • bad-meals.info
  • usa-guy.info
  • guy-fight.info
  • usa-fight.info
Update 2: The scam continues. This time the scammer uses dont-text.tk domain with a really interesting disclaimer (see full text).

See below for analysis of what the worm actually does and to do some hacking with it. As a bonus, you will get a live page to analyze worm spreading.

I published the source code files for the dont-text.info worm, so feel free to consult them if you're interested in all the details. I will only discuss the actions of the worm from the user's and technical perspective here.

Tuesday, September 21, 2010

"The Hottest girls on Facebook" everonia.com malware analysis

Another worm spreading with clickjacking technique is now active, targetting Facebook users. If your FB friends display something similar to this:

The hottest girls on facebook on everonia.com

don't follow the link. If you're curious, what is happening & how the attack works, read on.

Wednesday, December 23, 2009

5 ways to prevent clickjacking on your website (and why they suck)

Clickjacking attack is a very nasty attack. The most common form of it is when an attacker creates a webpage and tricks the visitor to click somewhere (on a link, button, image). Attacker in the code of his website includes a victim website (like Facebook, your webmail, amazon) that is cleverly hidden from the user and placed so that a user actually clicks on a victim website. Citing the example from OWASP page on clickjacking:

For example, imagine an attacker who builds a web site that has a button on it that says "click here for a free iPod". However, on top of that web page, the attacker has loaded an iframe with your mail account, and lined up exactly the "delete all messages" button directly on top of the "free iPod" button. The victim tries to click on the "free iPod" button but instead actually clicked on the invisible "delete all messages" button. In essence, the attacker has "hijacked" the user's click, hence the name "Clickjacking".
The problem with clickjacking attack is that it is extremely difficult to prevent. Unlike other popular vulnerabilities like CSRF, XSS, SQL injection, this one is based on a functionality that is widely used in the web nowadays - frames (I'm skipping the case of plugin-based-clickjacking for clarity here). Frames allow you to nest one webpage or widget in another page - this is now used for login pages, commenting, previewing content in CMSes, for JavaScript interactions and a million other things.

Browsers nowadays use same origin policy to protect your data if you're framing or being framed from another domain (this prevents JavaScripts from talking to each other and accesing documents across the domain boundary). But JavaScript is not required for a clickjacking attack - CSS is enough. In the simplest form (e.g. used in recent Facebook users attack), you're just using a small <iframe>, and position it absolutely. The rest is just social engineering.

Our users have a few options to protect themselves. So maybe 1% of them will be "protected". But what can we - web developers do to prevent the clickjacking on our sites? Sadly, not much, but here's the list:

Monday, December 21, 2009

New Facebook clickjacking attack in the wild - fb.59.to

There's a malicious website set up at http://fb.59.to that tries to trick users into a clickjacking attack that shares the link on victims' Facebook accounts.


Some Facebook users today saw a comment looking like this (new pix!):







Clicking on the comment that links to

http://www.facebook.com/l.php?u=http%253A%252F%252Ffb.59.to%252F%253F4ff11a526ae73e9f170bbe6702ebb93c&h=..somehash...&ref=nf

redirects users to http://fb.59.to web page.

On this page they are given a fake Turing test that tricks them into clicking a "blue button" which is their clickjacked Facebook page positioned at adding a new comment ("Share" button). The whole web page looks like this (clickjacked area is marked green):



In page source we can see that there is a IFRAME element:

<iframe frameborder=0 scrolling=no height=25 width=100
src="2.php?u=http://fb.59.to/?...somehash...."
></iframe><span style=background-color:yellow;><font 
style=font-size:13 ; color=white>

The target URL (2.php) has another IFRAME which in turn has yet another one with the target page being

<div style="left:-90px;top:-386px;position:absolute;"
<iframe height=400 width=250  src="http://www.facebook.com/sharer.php?u=http://fb.59.to/?hash" 
frameborder=0  scrolling=no> </iframe>
</div> 

Clicking on the button shares the malicious link on Facebook.

The page has a meta-redirect set up to a Youtube movie launching  in 12 seconds so a users might get the impression that the movie launched because they successfully passed the Turing test.

Multiple iframes are probably set up to trick clickjacking protections within browsers. A quick look tells that currently Firefox and Chrome are vulnerable to the attack, IE and Opera being safe, although that requires a bit more time to investigate.

Update: The attack does not work in IE and Opera only because of incorrect HTML used in one of the pages in this malicious site. Doing a simple fix in HTML makes both mentioned browsers also vulnerable to the attack.

Thanks go to Grzegorz Ciborowski and Pawel Czernikowski for detecting the attack.